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 Looking at the enormous price of the book, I indeed expected a voluminous work 
about social theories being applied to Japan, i.e. insights and explanations of Japanese 
phenomena or social dimensions from the viewpoint of "a leading sociological theorist" 
(as it states in the inside cover). In other words: more than five hundred pages full of 
elaborate social theory. To put it bluntly: This book is hard reading for anyone not too 
familiar with social theory or - worse - the English language. 
 The author, Johann P. Arnason, was born in Iceland and teaches currently at La-
Trobe University, Australia. He has several PhD's, reads more than half a dozen 
languages, and is regarded as one of the most well-versed sociologists dealing with 
Japan. His sociological background can be somewhat centered around the German 
Frankfurt School, to which internationally renowned social theorists like Jfirgen 
Habermas, Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horckheimer have contributed. The author 
has co-edited "Japanese Encounters with Postmodernity" (with Sugimoto Yoshio) 
and thereby proves to be a profound expert of Japanese social issues, although - as 
he admits - he does "not read Japanese, and the work on this project has certainly 
made [him] more aware of the language barrier." (xi) 
 This apparent flaw - in the eyes of scholars of Japanese studies at least - is not 
necessarily a disadvantage, because it opens up new approaches to the issue of 
"Japan" from the outside of th
e mostly literature-orientated methods of Japanology. 
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The advantage thus is his vast methodological resource, since the majority of books 
written in English and dealing with aspects of the Japanese society or culture make 
little or no use of the European social theory due to language problems (especially 
German and English speaking sociologists writing on Japan are rare). 
 The main focus of this book is hence an "interest in learning from Japan" and 
thereby contributing to the problems of social theory facing the "idea of modernity." 
(xiv-xv) The author tries to handle the problem by combining two currents of socio-
logical thought which explain the Japanese way to modernity either as a long-term 
process (for example Eisenstadt and his "axial breakthrough") or as a continuous 
undercurrent of traditional, i.e. historical remnants (mostly the US-American ap-
proach, that is H. Ooms, E. Ikegami, Th. De Bary et al.). These two ways he labels 
44 culturalist and historicist
." (xv) 
 The task of the author is now to link both approaches in " a tentative critical syn-
thesis" (xv) and show their meaningfulness regarding the interaction of power and 
. state-building" in Japan. This is a.difficult task, surely everybody admits, because it 
boils down to the heroic attempt of rewriting Japanese political history over the last 
1400 years. In this aspect, the title of the book is somewhat misleading, because the 
focus of the book lies on "processes of state formation and their social ramifications 
[ ... ]", since "cultural images and interpretations of power play a formative role in po-
litical and social change [ ... ]. " Here the Frankfurt school of thought pops up and the 
whole issue of Japanese power-politics is at stake. The author clearly favors the 
11 
seminal work" of Norbert Elias on "The Civilizing Process," which explains the 
transition of European court society (using the French example) into a pre-modern 
state through the intricate process of "internalization" of social rules. Although there 
is much doubt about the possible generalization of this explanation, since there exist 
great differences among the European aristocratic systems (French, English, Ger-
man), this work has definitely had a stimulating effect on the various interpretations 
of "civilizing processes." The "internalization" ("Verinnerlichung") of social norms as 
a predisposition to modern-age state-building stands in contrast to the more socio-
economical viewpoint of the development of modern (capitalist) systems as ventured 
by the rather post-Marxist ideas of "World Systems Theory" (L Wallerstein), which 
Arnason dismisses due to the same notion of over-generalization. So the main theme 
of his book is the never ending conflict of constructing something. like a state on 
foundations that were not always suitable. - And this makes it necessary to reach so 
far back into the past. And it lets the reader suffer due to the consequent problem of 
handling common denominators that could be handy in describing the Nara-state as 
well as the Meiji-nationalism. In finding one-fits-all descriptions, the author has 
definitely spend much care and thought. The main subject of the book (as we would 
expect from the title) had to disappear somehow into second rank. 
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 But let us follow the author's narrow and winding path between verification and 
speculation. (And a winding path it is indeed, especially for non-native speakers.) 
Regarding history as a continuous process where traditions are constantly (re-)in-
vented and discarded, bifurcations are only discernible from a temporally distanced 
location, and there is nothing like a wholesale "leap" in cultural or social "progress" 
(the word in itself already implies the evolutionary model of history as a way from "A" 
to "B", where "B" is better than "A"), the author has natural difficulties in estab-
lishing something like a "beginning." But nevertheless, since the formation of state 
building forces are the obvious focus, it seems quite plausible to start where historical 
records and Western history has set the beginning for Japanese state formation: the 
seventh century and the invention of the figure "emperor" as the political and religious 
center. Arnason links this process to the aspect of an "axial breakthrough" (Eisen-
stadt) : "The emergence of imperial formations cannot be explained in terms of the 
functional or evolutionary logic of social structures; rather, they are created by power 
elites which draw on cultural visions for the formulation and implementation of their 
strategies." (62) This certainly brings one main methodical obstacle to the fore: that 
is combining a rather person-orientated (or elitist) view with the more self-unfolding 
processes that are the consequences. Out of this basic difficulty the consecutive traps 
spring open automatically: A centralizing process of state formation in the beginning 
of the Heian Period is followed by "a long drawn-out process" which resulted in the 
decentralization of power in the thirteenth century by the twin-structure of a sh6gunal 
office in Kamakura and Muromachi and the religiously affiliated court in Heian. This 
already is the "secondary state formation" of the medieval military-political rulers, 
which had to rely on exiting social and political structures because of their weakness 
or incapability of abolishing the court. At this point, the line of argument slowly leaves 
the line of Weberian thought which Arnason had been trying to remodel earlier. 
Although the gross misunderstanding of Weber regarding Asia and particularly Japan 
is common knowledge, in terms of political processes his ghost still lingers in Europe, 
but has to be completely restructured when dealing with Japan: "In brief, it would 
seem that the emerging post-Weberian approach is less concerned with direct con-
nections between cultural patterns and economic innovation than with the broader and 
more complex configurations of culture and power." (22) Relying on Weber in ex-
plaining political and social "configurations" in Japan thus could be of interest in itself, 
but certainly leads to further complication and distraction in this work. 
 One of these configurations is the constant and more or less effective involvement 
in power politics which can at least partly be hold responsible for the "Sengoku Jidai", 
which started with differences in the center of political power and soon cumulated in 
a common struggle for survival that left only the most ruthless warlords alive. For this 
aspect, Arnason relies on the works of Ikegami Eiko (E. Ikegami. The Taming of the 
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Samurai. Princeton 1995) where she in turn tries to apply the already mentioned 
. civilizing process" of "internalization." Hence the strong emphasis on the work of 
Norbert Elias. But the weakness of his work, namely the narrow foundation of his 
work on the French aristocracy, proves to be equally unconvincing for the explanation 
of the "containment" politics of the Tokugawa rulers that eventually emerged out of 
this "decomposition" of the Japanese state system. (At this point, the basic referential 
book of Herman Ooms (H. Ooms. Tokugawa Ideology. Princeton 1985), is exploited 
down to the bottom line.) 
 The notion of "state" in this context is solely defined as the central authority's 
ability to exercise power. But only from the seventeenth century onwards can we talk 
of more or less unified state politics and the overall social agreement on "who rules", 
since a uniform exercise of power is dependent on the ability of the.'ruling center' to 
be acknowledged as such. Hence the process is justly defined by Arnason as "cen-
tralization, " i.e. centripetal tendencies of the Tokugawa trying to overcome the more 
centrifugal forces of the over 250 daimy6 and the slowly but steadily increasing eco-
nomic recovery of the rural society. "The consolidation of the Tokugawa rule led, in 
the first instance, to more systematic politics of economic control and mobilization 
with a nationwide scope; but this part of the new political project was [ ... ] conducive 
to more autonomous economic development on a much larger scale than in the six-
teenth century." (303/304) 
 But why reachso far back in history? The founding of a pre-modern state in Japan 
in the sixteenth century by the three "unifiers" Oda, Toyotomi and Tokugawa is 
common ground in social theory since the ground-breaking works of Maruyama Ma-
sao. Arnason connects this process of "pre-modern state formation", implying the 
11 unprecedented increase in the order-building as well as the transformative potential 
of culture" (63), to the "secondary state formation" by the thirteenth century 
Kamakura Shogunate. This "secondary state formation" had to draw on existing 
power structures that had been established in the Heian Period and thereby live on a 
modus vivendi and a split of political power between the imperial court and the mili-
tary rulers. To explain the beginning of this dual structure the author reaches further 
back to seventh century Japan as "primary state formation", where a Chinese model 
of government was somehow mixed with indigenous requirements. This seems at best 
provocative and rather demonstrates the ambiguity of ubiquitarian social denomina-
tors than posing a convincing argument, because identifying seventh century Japan as 
14 primary state formation" clearly omits the question of what in turn the rulers at that 
time had to get along with. The author cannot but trace lines further and further back, 
and thereby applies roughly the same methods as the "Nihonki": pure speculation. 
  --Of course, ironically speaking, looking at history from a later point, 'somehow' all 
processes seem to have taken shape as projects. A group of people 'somehow' got 
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together and decided on 4 somehow' changing things. And then - somehow - this 
developed into 'something' on its own due to unforeseeable influences and still lin-
gering common social attitudes. However complex the author tries to describe all the 
"b
uts" and "alsos," the discrepancy between history as a "non-intentional" process 
(Elias) and the more elitist perspective remains unsolved. The effort of linking two 
main social theories ( 11 culturalist and historicist") and two cultural modes (Western 
approach and "Japanese experience") together only makes sense if the author himself 
throws his academic weight into the sparring. Reading too many concessions to all 
sides, the reader is utterly confused. 
  On the contrary, trying to link the modern era (Meiji) to this plot shows the 
difficulties even more clearly. Also due to the elaborate work already done in this field, 
the author finds it increasingly difficult to combine forces: "The most plausible ap-
proach to the history of the developmentatstate [Arnason defines Meiji-Japan as such, 
using the term of Chalmers Johnson (C. Johnson. MITI and the Japanese Miracle. 
Stanford 1982)] is one which emphasizes the interplay of culture, rationality, power 
and situation: Cultural orientations are reflected in the responses to conditions which 
call for innovative strategies as well as in the power structures which grow out of such 
situations, but transformations of power relations - internal and external - and 
consequent reorientations of strategy can also lead to changes in the functioning and 
composition of cultural factors." (391) This is a common tautology, but not sufficient 
to construct he nationalist phase in prewar politics out of centuries of post-feudalism 
(if we simply define feudalism as a system which turns land into power) and a cen-
tralizing undercurrent in the Japanese state making since Sh6toku Taishi. - Espe-
cially if we compare this to the much acknowledged book by Carol Gluck (C. Gluck. 
Japan's Modern Myths. Princeton 1985) 
 By combining all the different approaches which are in themselves necessarily in-
sufficient (and never aim to be comprehensive) to explain the Japanese way of 
state-building, Mr. Arnason gets somewhat lost in finding a path between different 
theories regarding Japan and their temporary setting. Personally, I missed the theo-
retical background of the French thought (Foucault, Braudel, Annales) -of the inter-
penetration of power and society as well as some more clearly spelled out personal 
views. On the other hand, his strength is the discussion of social theories (especially 
chapter 8 ), but the impression remains that Japan is just a case study for his vast 
bibliographical work on these last two decades' theories and to prove he has read them 
all. So the beef is certainly not his "Japanese experience," but rather the self-imposed 
theoretical struggle among sociologists. Or to put it in simple words (E.O. Reischauer, 
quoted by C. Steenstrup): This book is . over-researched and under-written. 
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